In a 7-2 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that SEIU California Local 100 violated the First Amendment rights of its 28,000 "fair share" nonmembers by imposing a 25% emergency increase in dues for a "Political Fight Back Fund" to oppose Prop. 75 but not maintaining Hudson rights. The Court held that this constituted compelled speech. The Court held that nonmembers must opt-in to special assessments for political purposes. As Justice Alito put it in his majority opinion: "When a public-sector union imposes a special assessment or dues increase, the union ... may not exact any funds from nonmembers without their affirmative consent." This is a relatively narrow holding but the logic of the decision, as Justice Breyer's dissent points out, puts the entire opt-out system created by the Abood and Hudson decisions on the defensive. It points the way to a situation where all political dues for nonmembers would require them to opt-in.
The case's summary put the matter quite sternly: "The justification for permitting a union to collect fees from nonmembers--to prevent them from free-riding on the union's efforts--is an anomaly. Similarly, requiring objecting nonmembers to opt out of paying the nonchargeable portion of union dues―rather than exempting them unless they opt in―represents a remarkable boon for unions, creating a risk that the fees nonmembers pay will be used to further political and ideological ends with which they do not agree." There are other interest things in the case...
One is the amount of dues being spent on politics. Defenders of public sector unions often say that most of members dues are spent on the costs of collective bargaining. Not so in California. In 2005, nonunion members of SEIU 100 were notified of that only 56% of the full dues were used for collective bargaining and other purposes for which they are required to pay. The other 44% were to be spent on politics. If they opted-out, they would get back 44% of the fees they paid.
Another thing the Court notes, is the arbitrary nature of union decisions about what constitutes political spending and what constitutes a "chargeable" expense for collective bargaining. As the Court puts it, "the SEIU's understanding of the breadth of chargeable expenses is so expansive that it is hard to place much reliance on its statistics. 'Lobbying the electorate,' which the SEIU claims is chargeable, is nothing more than another term for supporting political causes and candidates." In determining Hudson rights, unions hold most of the cards, and they have a clear incentive to keep as much money as possible from nonmembers.
One is the amount of dues being spent on politics. Defenders of public sector unions often say that most of members dues are spent on the costs of collective bargaining. Not so in California. In 2005, nonunion members of SEIU 100 were notified of that only 56% of the full dues were used for collective bargaining and other purposes for which they are required to pay. The other 44% were to be spent on politics. If they opted-out, they would get back 44% of the fees they paid.
Another thing the Court notes, is the arbitrary nature of union decisions about what constitutes political spending and what constitutes a "chargeable" expense for collective bargaining. As the Court puts it, "the SEIU's understanding of the breadth of chargeable expenses is so expansive that it is hard to place much reliance on its statistics. 'Lobbying the electorate,' which the SEIU claims is chargeable, is nothing more than another term for supporting political causes and candidates." In determining Hudson rights, unions hold most of the cards, and they have a clear incentive to keep as much money as possible from nonmembers.
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